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The Mandatory Arrest Law: Police Reaction
Kevin Walsh*
I. Introduction
The Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention
Act of 19941 amends section 140.10 of the Criminal Procedure
Law, 2 to mandate arrest in certain domestic violence situations.
The new law states:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, a police of-
ficer shall arrest a person, and shall not attempt to reconcile the
parties or mediate, where such officer has reasonable cause to be-
lieve that:
(a) a felony, other than subdivisions three, four, nine or ten of
section 155.30 of the penal law, has been committed by such
person against a member of the same family or household, as
defined in subdivision one of section 530.11 of this chapter; or
(b) a duly served order of protection is in effect, or an order of
which the respondent or defendant has actual knowledge be-
cause he was present in court when such order was issued; and
(i) Such order directs that the respondent or defendant stay
away from persons on whose behalf the order of protection
has been issued and the respondent or defendant commit-
ted an act or acts in violation of such 'stay away' provision
of such order; or
(ii) The respondent or defendant commits a family offense
as defined in subdivision one of section eight hundred
twelve of the family court act or section 530.12 of this chap-
ter in violation of such order of protection ....
(c) a misdemeanor constituting a family offense, as described in
subdivision one of section 530.11 of this chapter and section 812
of the Family Court Act, has been committed by such person
* Kevin Walsh is a sergeant with the New York City Police Department, as-
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1. Ch. 222, [1994] N.Y. Laws 786 (McKinney)(revised at ch. 224, § 1, [1994]
N.Y. Laws 808).
2. N.Y. CmM. PRoc. LAw § 140.10 (McKinney 1994).
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against such family or household member, unless the victim re-
quests otherwise. The officer shall not inquire as to whether
the victim seeks an arrest of such person.
Nothing contained in this subdivision shall be deemed to re-
strict or impair the authority of any municipality, political subdi-
vision or the division of state police from promulgating rules,
regulations and policies requiring the arrest of persons in addi-
tional circumstances where domestic violence has allegedly oc-
curred .... 3
The mandatory arrest requirement in certain domestic vio-
lence situations is unique, due to the fact that no other class of
offense requires arrest. The Criminal Procedure Law states
that a police officer "may arrest" for all other classes of of-
fenses.4 The new subdivision states that a police officer "shall
arrest a person, and shall not attempt to reconcile the parties or
mediate .... ."5 The use of the word "shall," in contrast to "may,"
indicates obligation or necessity.6 Why has this class of offenses
been singled out for mandatory arrest? What factors brought
this mandatory arrest law about?
II. Background
Traditional police practice in domestic violence cases has
been to invoke arrest as a last resort, with preference being
given to mediation or separation of the parties involved. In
1967, a training manual of the International Association of
Chiefs of Police stated that "in dealing with family disputes, the
power of arrest should be exercised as a last resort."7 Often
overlooked is the fact that other entities also endorsed this posi-
tion. The American Bar Association stated in 1973 that police
"should engage in the resolution of conflict such as that which
occurs between husband and wife . . . without reliance upon
criminal assault or disorderly conduct statutes."8 Moreover,
3. N.Y. CRIm. PRoc. LAW § 140.10 (4) (McKinney 1995).
4. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 140.10 (1) (McKinney 1995).
5. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 140.10 (4) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
6. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1375 (6th ed. 1990) states that shall, as used in
statutes, is "generally imperative or mandatory" language.
7. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, TRAINING KEY 16: HAN-
DLING DISTURBANCE CALLS (1967).
8. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION (1973).
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sociologists have recommended avoiding arrest in domestic vio-
lence situations, favoring crisis intervention strategies and re-
ferrals to counseling. It has been a widely held belief that
arrest may aggravate the domestic violence situation, and pos-
sibly lead to further violence.
Litigation against police departments throughout the coun-
try has significantly changed the traditional approach to resolv-
ing domestic violence cases. The case most often cited is
Thurman v. Torrington.9 In Thurman, the plaintiff brought a
civil rights action against the City of Torrington and the police
officers of that city, alleging that her civil rights, and those of
her son, were violated when police officers failed to perform
their duties. 10 The plaintiff's estranged husband had repeat-
edly threatened the lives of the plaintiff and her child, and the
plaintiff alleged that police officers had ignored her attempts to
file complaints against her estranged husband. 1 The estranged
husband, despite a restraining order, continued to approach the
plaintiff.12 Eventually, the estranged husband's threats esca-
lated to a physical assault, resulting in the plaintiff's being
stabbed repeatedly.13
The plaintiff in Thurman claimed that her constitutional
right to equal protection of the laws was violated because police
officers afforded less protection to persons abused in domestic
situations, than to persons abused outside of a domestic rela-
tionship.14 The court stated that police officers "are under an
affirmative duty to preserve law and order, and to protect the
personal safety of persons in the community." 15 The court fur-
ther held that this affirmative duty required a police officer to
protect the personal safety of all persons in the community, and
failure to do so was a denial of the victim's constitutional right
to equal protection of the laws.' 6
9. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
10. Id. at 1521.
11. Id. at 1524.
12. Id. at 1525.
13. Id. at 1525-26.
14. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1526-27.
15. Id. at 1527 (citing Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864, 872-73 (N.D. Ill.
1967)).
16. Id.
1995]
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In New York, Sorichetti v. City of New York 17 led to major
changes in the policy of the New York City Police Department.
In Sorichetti, the plaintiff's infant daughter had been injured by
her father, and the plaintiff brought an action alleging that the
New York City Police Department had "negligently failed to
take [the father] into custody or otherwise prevent his assault
upon his daughter after [the police had been] informed that [the
father] may have violated ... a[n] order of protection and...
had threatened to do harm to the infant."18 The facts of the case
indicated that the plaintiff had obtained three separate orders
of protection, ordering the father to stay away from the plain-
tiff's home, and providing for the father's visitation of the infant
daughter.19 The order allowing visitation included a provision
stating that the order was governed by the Family Court Act
section 168.20 That section states that:
The presentation of a copy of an order ... to any peace officer...
shall constitute authority for him to arrest a person charged with
violating the terms of such order of protection... and bring such
person before the court and, otherwise, so far as lies within his
power, to aid in securing the protection such order was intended
to afford .... 2 1
The court held that an order such as the one presented cre-
ated a special relationship between the municipality and the in-
dividual, which imposed a duty on the police department to
protect the individual.22 The court further stated that the pur-
pose of the Family Court Act section 168 was to "encourage po-
lice involvement in domestic matters, an area in which the
police traditionally have exhibited a reluctance to intervene."2
However, the changes in police arrest policies were not driven
solely by litigation.
In the early 1980's, a Minneapolis study of misdemeanor
assault cases in Minneapolis indicated that arrest, as compared
to separation of the parties or mediation of the parties, acted as
17. 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985).
18. Id. at 463, 482 N.E.2d at 71, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
19. Id. at 464-65, 482 N.E.2d at 72-73, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 593-94.
20. Id. at 465, 482 N.E.2d at 73, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
21. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 168 (McKINNEY 1995).
22. Sorichetti, 65 N.Y.2d at 468-69, 482 N.E.2d at 75, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 595-96.
23. Id. at 469, 482 N.E.2d at 75, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
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a deterrent to future violence in the household. 24 In terms of its
impact on police policy throughout the nation, this study was
considered the most influential criminal justice research ever
compiled, impacting mandatory arrest laws and other policies
throughout the states. In 1984, the year the Minnaepolis report
was initially released, only ten percent of police agencies in cit-
ies with a population greater than 100,000 utilized arrest as the
preferred policy for misdemeanor domestic violence. 25 "By 1988,
[ninety percent] of police agencies either 'encouraged' or 're-
quired' arrest in such cases."26
The effects of the Minneapolis study have also been seen in
state laws. To date, fourteen states and the District of Colum-
bia have some form of a law mandating arrest in domestic vio-
lence situations.27 Specifically, New York has replicated the
Minneapolis experiment on a large scale by introducing
mandatory arrest provisions to the Criminal Procedure Law.28
The New York State Office for the Prevention of Domestic Vio-
lence and the State Division of Criminal Justice Services will
analyze the impact of the mandatory arrest law on the inci-
dence of family offenses and submit a final analysis to the gov-
ernor and the legislature by January 1, 2001. A determination
will be made at that time whether to continue the mandatory
arrest provisions.
III. Changes for the Police
As a result of lawsuits, pressure from advocate's groups,
and other external factors, many police departments have be-
gun adopting mandatory arrest policies. The existing New York
City Police Department policy, patrol guide section 110-38,29 ex-
ceeds the requirements of the new mandatory arrest law. This
24. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERI-
MENTS AND DILEMMAS 12 (1992).
25. Id. at 14.
26. Id.
27. JOAN ZORZA & LAURIE WOODS, MANDATORY ARREST: PROBLEMS AND POS-
SiBILiTIEs 11 (1994).
28. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 140.10 (4) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
29. CITY OF NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT, INTERIM ORDER No. 10
(1995)(amending NEW YoRK CITY PATROL GUIDE PROC. (1988))(hereinafter referred
to as INTERIM ORDER No. 10)(the patrol guide is the domestic violence arrest policy
of the New York City Police Department).
1995] 101
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policy requires arrest for all felonies, all violations of orders of
protection, and at the victim's request.3 In 1994, New York
City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani and Police Commissioner Wil-
liam J. Bratton, introduced one in a series of strategies for com-
bating crime and disorder.31 This strategy includes a revision of
the Police Department's policy, and dedication of personnel spe-
cifically trained in domestic violence issues.32 The provisions of
the Family Intervention and Domestic Violence Prevention Act
of 1994 were incorporated into Department policies. The new
procedure reinforces the Police Department's pro-arrest stance,
especially in misdemeanor cases.33 A future revision will in-
clude a provision requiring that police officers not ask the vic-
tim's arrest preference. As a result of the strategy and the
Department's renewed emphasis on domestic violence, prelimi-
nary statistics indicate that arrests in which the offender and
the victim are related to one another are on the rise.
Mandatory arrest, as law or policy, simplifies the work of
police officers who are often confronted with situations that are
considered "gray areas." Much of the police frustration sur-
rounding domestic violence is caused by the absence of clear
policies and procedures for handling these cases.3 4 The
mandatory arrest approach greatly simplifies a police officer's
process of decision-making in the field. Discretionary guide-
lines are often vague, and require police officers to make assess-
ments of the potential for future violence, a challenge that has
eluded even the best-trained psychologists. 35 A blanket policy
of mandatory arrest also offers some protection from civil liabil-
ity for the police officer.36
In contrast to prior methods, such as mediation or crisis in-
tervention, arrest is a tool familiar to police officers. Arrest has
the advantage of being "police work," as opposed to "social
30. Id. at 5-7.
31. RUDOLPH W. GxuLLANI & WiLLLAM J. BRATrON, POLICE STRATEGY No. 4:
BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1994).
32. Id. at 19-24.
33. INTERIM ORDER No. 10, supra note 29.
34. DELBERT S. ELLIOT, Criminal Justice Procedures in Family Violence
Crimes, in CRIME AND JUSTicE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael
Toury, eds., 1989).
35. Jeremy Travis (1993). Testimony before the State Legislature.
36. ZoRzA, supra note 27, at 33.
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work," a role that most police officers are untrained for and un-
comfortable with. Police officers are trained in law enforce-
ment, and mandatory arrest is in line with this training.
However, mandatory arrest presents problems for the criminal
justice system, as discussed below.
IV. Statutory Limitations on the Power of Arrest
The adoption of a mandatory arrest policy does not change
the need for probable cause or reasonable belief that a person
committed a crime, as required by New York law.3 7 As with any
other offense, probable cause must exist before an arrest can be
made. Some well-intentioned police officers may misinterpret
the intent of a mandatory arrest policy as requiring an arrest
every time the police respond to a reported domestic dispute.
Police are required to safeguard the rights of all persons be-
cause all persons are presumed innocent until proven guilty in a
court of law.
The New York City Patrol Guide states that probable cause
is:
A combination of facts, viewed through the eyes of a police officer,
which would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an
offense is being or has been committed. The 'probable cause' stan-
dard applied in family offense/domestic violence offenses is no dif-
ferent from the standard applied in other offenses and may be met
by evidence other than the statement of the complainant/victim. 38
The issue of determining probable cause must be explored
through enhanced training for police officers as the mandatory
arrest law takes effect. The public also needs to be educated on
this vital subject in regard to the realistic limits of police of-
ficers' duties and responsibilities.
37. See N.Y. CRm. PRoc. LAw § 70.10 (2) (McKinney 1994). The Criminal Pro-
cedure Law states:
Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense exists
when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or cir-
cumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to
convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it
is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person
committed it. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, such apparently
reliable evidence may include or consist of hearsay.
38. INTnM ORDER No. 10, supra note 29, at 2 (emphasis in original).
1995] 103
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Limitations with respect to the power of arrest also exist for
violations. Police officers in New York City may arrest only
when violations are committed in their presence. Disorderly
conduct and harassment are violations under the penal law that
commonly arise in domestic situations. In order for a police of-
ficer to arrest for these offenses, the act must be committed in
the officer's presence. 39 These offenses encompass a broad
range of behavior including: slapping, punching, and kicking,
and account for the vast majority of reported domestic violence
cases. In most cases, however, the offense has already been
committed by the time the police officer(s) has arrived, and the
officer's role is limited to taking a report, and, possibly, refer-
ring the complainant to court. These situations will remain un-
affected by the mandatory arrest law.
V. The Dual Arrest problem
One potential problem, frequently found in jurisdictions
with mandatory arrest laws, is the dilemma of dual arrests or
the arrest of both parties involved in a domestic dispute. Fre-
quently, upon arrival at the scene of a domestic dispute, the po-
lice find that both parties may have committed offenses. The
private nature of domestic violence means that there may be no
witnesses to the crime. In the past, police could use discretion
in these circumstances and arrest only one of the parties. Now,
however, mandate requires that police arrest both parties.
Other jurisdictions 4O have written "primary physical ag-
gressor" or "self defense" language into their mandatory arrest
laws, allowing officers to arrest only the individual determined
to be the primary aggressor and disallowing arrest of an indi-
vidual who is determined to be acting in self-defense. New York
law did not incorporate primary physical aggressor language
into its mandatory arrest law.41 As a result of this omission,
39. N.Y. CRIm. PRoc. LAW § 140.10 (1)(a) (McKinney 1994).
40. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601B (1989); 1994 IowA AcTs 2160; NEV. REV.
STAT. § 171.137 (2) (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.055 (2) (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 12-29-3(c) (Michie 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS ANN. § 23A-3-2.2 (Michie 1995);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.10 0(2)(B) (West 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.075
(3)(a) (West 1985).
41. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 140.10 (McKinney 1994); see also INTERIM ORDER
No. 10, supra note 29.
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dual arrest rates may increase. The law provides protection
from liability for police officers who make good faith arrests for
domestic violence offenses, but fails to address the situation
where both parties commit offenses that trigger the mandatory
arrest law.42
VI. The Response of the Criminal Justice System to
Mandatory Arrest
In order to be effective, a mandatory arrest law needs to
involve the entire criminal justice system. Many laws focus
only on the role of law enforcement, and neglect the remainder
of the system. Prosecutors, courts, jails, probation officers, and
treatment programs need more resources for the ever-increas-
ing case load that mandatory arrest will bring. For mandatory
arrest to succeed, all areas of the criminal justice system must
be reinforced and redesigned to compliment one another. The
police departments, the most visible and familiar part of the
criminal justice system, are often blamed for the deficiencies of
the entire system.
A police officer's primary contact within the criminal justice
system is through the prosecutor. Interaction between the po-
lice officer and the prosecutor often determines the effectiveness
of the criminal justice system in a particular case. "Prosecutors
have the greatest discretion in the criminal justice system. The
character, quality, and efficiency of the whole system is heavily
influenced by the way prosecutors exercise their discretionary
power."43 When the prosecutor reduces or drops the charges af-
ter a domestic violence arrest has been made, the police officer
is in a difficult position when approaching the batterer and the
victim. When an arrest is effected, but the charges are dropped
or reduced, the police officer's ability to provide safety to the
victim is reduced. Batterers also receive the message that their
offenses are not taken seriously by the system and that arrest
results in few, if any, sanctions.
The end result of the failure to prosecute after a domestic
violence arrest may be to reduce the use of arrest in the domes-
tic violence situation:
42. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 140.10(4) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
43. ELLIOT, supra note 34, at 458.
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From the police perspective, there is little reason to make an
arrest if the prosecutor will foreseeably dismiss the case .... If
prosecutors pursued family violence cases aggressively, there
would be more incentive for police to make arrests. Prosecutors
have their own organizational objectives that may justify this ac-
tion, but it nevertheless communicates to the police that their use
of arrest in domestic violence cases is not supported by the court.
44
Failure of the criminal justice system in this manner under-
mines the mandatory arrest law. Officers who make arrests
only to see the offender released within a matter of hours often
feel that their efforts are wasted and that the system does not
consider the offense a serious one.
VII. Conclusion
Victims who find that the criminal justice system does not
protect them may hesitate to go to the police in the future for
help. Batterers who are quickly processed through the system
and released, learn that their offenses are not taken seriously,
and that arrest is merely an inconvenience. Additionally, bat-
terers may not be deterred by the threat of arrest in the future.
If arrests lose their deterrent value, then the purpose of the
mandatory arrest law is seriously impaired. 45
Mandatory arrest is not an automatic quick-fix or cure-all solu-
tion to the problems of domestic violence. A mandatory arrest law
should be adopted only as part of a coordinated response in com-
munities that handle domestic violence cases. As part of a well
thought-out community response with sufficient resources and
planning and monitoring, mandatory arrest can improve protec-
tion for battered women and their children.46
44. ELLIOT, supra note 34, at 459.
45. J. DAVID HIRSCHEL & IRA HUTCHISON, Police-Preferred Arrest Policies, in
WoMAN BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES 49, 67 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991).
46. ZoRzA, supra note 27, at 43.
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A COMPARISON OF THE MANDATORY ARREST LAW
AND EXISTING NYPD POLICY
Type of Offense
Felonies
Violations of orders
of protection
Misdemeanors
Violations in the
presence of the
officer
Criminal
Procedure Law
Section 140.10
(1994)
Mandatory arrest for
all Felonies except
sections of PL 155.30
(Grand Larceny)
Mandatory arrest
when:
1. A stay away order
is violated.
2. The violation is a
family offense:
Assault 2nd or 3rd
degree, Attempted
Assault, Harassment,
Disorderly Conduct,
Reckless
Endangerment,
Menacing 2nd or 3rd
degree.
Family Offense
misdemeanors,
unless the victim
requests otherwise.
No mandatory
arrest.
Patrol Guide
section 110-38
(1988)
Mandatory arrest for
all Felonies
Mandatory arrest for
ALL violations of
orders of protection.
Mandatory arrest for
all misdemeanors
when:
1. The victim
requests an arrest be
made; or
2. The officer
determines an arrest
is warranted.
Mandatory arrest
when:
1. The victim
requests an arrest be
made; or
2. The officer
determines an arrest
is warranted.
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Felonies
RELATIONS INCLUDED
FOR MANDATORY
ARREST PURPOSES
Violations of orders
of protection
Misdemeanors
Family Court defined
relations:
1. persons related by
consanguinity or
affinity;
2. legally married;
3. formerly married;
4. persons who have
a child in common
Mandatory arrest for
all Felonies
Mandatory arrest
when:
1. A stay away order
is violated.
2. The violation is a
family offense:
Assault 2nd or 3rd
degree, Attempted
Assault, Harassment,
Disorderly Conduct,
Reckless
Endangerment,
Menacing 2nd or 3rd
degree.
Family Offense
misdemeanors,
unless the victim
requests otherwise.
Family Court defined
relations AND Living
together or formerly
lived together in a
family type
relationship,
including same sex
couples
Mandatory arrest for
all Felonies except
sections of PL 155.30
(Grand Larceny)
Mandatory arrest for
ALL violations of
orders of protection.
Mandatory arrest for
all misdemeanors
when:
1. The victim
rerquests an arrest
be made; or
2. The officer
determines an arrest
is warranted.
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